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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 39591-2012

)
)
WILLIAM FIFER,
)
)
Defendant/Appellant.
____________)

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

JAMES A. SCHILLER
Magistrate Judge

FOR THE APPELLANT:

Matthew J. Roker
LOVAN ROKER & ROUNDS, P.C.
717 S. Kimball, Suite 200
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

FOR THE RESPONDENT:

LA WREN CE G. WASDEN
Idaho Attorney General
Statehouse, Room 210
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii
The Right To Appeal Was Preserved With Stipulated Agreement Pursuant To Idaho Criminal
Rule 11 (a)(2) ................................................................................................................................... 1
The Denial Of Appellant's Motion To Dismiss Should Be Reversed Because The "Community
Caretaking Function" Is Not An Independent ExceptionTo The Warrant Requirement ................ 1
Even if the "Community Caretaking Function" Is an Independent Exception to the Warrant
Requirement, The Denial of Appellant's Motion to Dismiss Should be Reversed Because The
Intrusive Action Of Officer Wade Was Not Reasonable In View Of All Surrounding
Circumstance ................................................................................................................................... 5
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 7
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ...................................................................................................... 8

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - i

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Cases
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) ........................................................................ 1, 2, 3, 4
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) .......................................................................... 2
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) ...................................................................................... 3

In Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, (1988) .......................................................................... 3, 5, 6
State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752,754 (1997) ................................................................................ 3, 5
State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442, (Ct. App. 2001) ........................................................................ 3, 4
Brigham City, Utah v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398,404 (2006) ......................................................... 4, 5
State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864,867 (Ct. App. 1995) ..................................................................... 5
State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821,824 (Ct. App. 2002) ................................................................... 5
State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Idaho App. 2006) ...................................................................... 6, 7

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - ii

The Right to Appeal Was Preserved With Stipulated Agreement Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
1 l(a)(2).

Respondent argues that Appellant failed to preserve his right to appeal the denial of the
motion to suppress prior to entering a plea of guilty. The Register Of Action Report provides
that on March 21, 2011 a status conference was held where a stipulation for entry of plea
pursuant to Rule 11 was entered with Defendant's written plea of guilty and the matter was set
over for sentencing. The Caldwell City Prosecuting Attorney who Respondent now represents
signed the stipulation reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
Appellant argues that the Register of Actions Report adequately supports the entry of a
conditional plea of guilty reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
Appellant will also move to augment the record with the written Rule 1 l(a)(2) previously filed
with the District Court.

The Denial Of Appellant's Motion To Dismiss Should Be Reversed Because The "Community
Caretaking Function" Is Not An Independent Exception To The Warrant Requirement.

The Respondent asserts that the community caretaking function is one exception to the 4 th
Amendment's warrant requirement. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-8). The "community caretaking
function" was first used to describe the duties of law enforcement officers as it relates to search
and seizure by the United Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). The
issue for the Cady Court's determination was whether the officers' warrantless search of the
defendant's vehicle violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from the
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unreasonable search and seizure of his car. Id. at 442. The Comt provided the following
analysis:

As a result of our federal system of government, however, state and local
police officers, unlike federal officers, have much more contact with vehicles for
reasons related to the operation of vehicles themselves. All States require vehicles
to be registered and operators to be licensed. States and localities have enacted
extensive and detailed codes regulating the condition and manner in which motor
vehicles may be operated on public streets and highways.
Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also
because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or involved in
an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact involving
automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or
office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may believe the operator
has violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be of that nature. Local
police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents
in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want
of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions,
totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence
relating to the violation of a criminal statute.
Id. at 441.

The Court ultimately determined that the search of the defendant's vehicle was not
unreasonable and, therefore, did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at
448. The importance of the Court's decision in Cady was not a finding that the "community
caretaking function" of police officers is an exception to the warrant requirement. When using
the term, the Court's discussion focused on the reasonableness of seizing and ultimately
searching vehicles, not people.
Later U.S. Supreme Court cases make clear that the Cady decision is not a foundation for
a general "community caretaking" exception to the warrant requirement, but instead a part of the
"inventory search" exception to the warrant requirement. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976) (analyzing the history of the Court's precedent applying the Fourth Amendment
to automobiles, including Cady, and finding that a routine search of a vehicle lawfully
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impounded for a parking violation did not violate the Fourth Amendment.); see also Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (citing to Cady and Opperman, upholding an inventory search of a
van seized after the driver was arrested for D .U .L as it was conducted pursuant to policy even
though the officers had discretion whether to impound the vehicle.)
Idaho precedent applying the "community caretaking function" has gone astray from the
articulation given by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cady. In Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817,
(1988), an officer saw a vehicle in a parking lot adjacent to a bar early in the morning with the
headlights on, the engine running, and a person passed out in the driver's seat with his head
slumped forward. The officer opened the vehicle's door, reached in, turned off the motor and
took possession of the keys. Id. at 818. The Idaho Supreme Court cited Cady as precedent, and
reasoned that the officer had a duty to investigate and that his actions were consistent with his
caretaking function. Id. The Court failed to recognize that to justify the seizure under the
community care taking function, such a seizure must be "totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Cady,
413 U.S. at 441.
The Idaho Supreme Court has found that when analyzing a seizure under the "community
caretaking function," the court must look to the totality of the circumstances and determine
"whether the intrusive action of the police was reasonable in view of all the surrounding
circumstances." State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754 (1997). While this line of reasoning seems
to comport with U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the Fourth Amendment, the test
later articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442, (Ct. App.
2001), does not. In Deccio, police received an anonymous tip that a person was intoxicated,
armed with a gun, and intending to kill himself. Id. at 443-44. A deputy spotted defendant's car
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and followed. Id. at 444. The deputy did not observe any violations of traffic laws, but pulled
the defendant over anyway. Id. The defendant was eventually arrested for D.U.I. Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Deccio stated that, "li]n order for the community
caretaking function analysis to apply, an officer must possess a subjective belief that an
individual is in need of immediate assistance, although the officer may harbor at least an
expectation of detecting or finding evidence of a crime." Id. at 445. This analysis does not
comport with the U.S. Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because under Cady,
the community caretaking function justification must be totally divorced from any criminal
investigation. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441. Also, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected any
analysis of an officer's subjective beliefs and instead required the test for reasonableness be
objective. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398,404 (2006).
Appellant does not assert that police should always refrain from engaging m any
investigation into an individual's welfare. However, police may not seize an individual, whether
to investigate a crime or to investigate the person's welfare, unless the seizure was objectively
reasonable.
In the case of Appellant, it would have been reasonable for the officer to approach
Appellant's vehicle and ask Appellant if he was alright.

The Fourth Amendment is not

implicated in such a consensual situation. Instead, the officer effectuated his overhead lights and
immediately seized Appellant without having witnessed neither any violation of traffic laws, or
any signs of distress from Appellant. Such intrusive action by police cannot be justified by the
"community caretaking function" and all evidence obtained through the exploitation of an illegal
seizure must be suppressed as a "fruit of the poisonous tree."

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF -4

Even If The "Community Caretaking Function" Is An Independent Exception To The Warrant
Requirement. The Denial Of Appellant's Motion To Dismiss Should Be Reversed Because The
Intrusive Action Of Officer Wade Was Not Reasonable In View Of All Surrounding
Circumstances.

The Respondent correctly asserts that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).

Idaho Courts

recognize the community caretaking function as an exception to the warrant requirement that
allows police officers to help individuals that officers believe are in need of immediate
assistance. State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754 (1997). In determining whether a particular
community caretaker-related contact justifies a detention, Idaho courts must analyze "whether
the intrusive action of the police was reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances."

Id. (quoting State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1995). The reasonableness of an
officer's actions under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement is to be
tested upon practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons act. State v.

Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002). The community caretaking function does not
allow an officer to seize individuals where no serious harm is threatened. Id. at 825.

Respondent asserts that the circumstances presented in In Re Clayton, 113 Idaho 817
(1988) are analogous to those presented in our case. In Clayton, as recited above, an officer
opens the vehicle door to check on the driver who is passed out and slumped over the driver's
wheel at 1:30 in the morning. Id. 818. The vehicle is located in a parking lot outside of a bar
and the vehicle's engine is running. Id. The Court stated "[t]ested upon practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable persons act, this situation falls outside the boundaries of
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 5

normal conduct." Id. The Court ruled that under those circumstances there was a sufficient and
objective basis for the officer to further investigate a D.U.I. Id.
The circumstances in our case are easily distinguishable from those in Clayton. The
officer in Clayton personally witnessed what appeared to be obvious exigent circumstances when
he saw the defendant passed out. In our case, Officer Wade does not personally witness anything
that would lead a person to believe that somebody needed aid, or that an ongoing emergency was
at hand. The time of day was 5:30 P.M. and Appellant did not appear to be driving erratic or
unlawfully while outside of a Walgreens'. Furthermore, the caller to 911 had informed dispatch
that she had asked Appellant if he needed assistance and he had responded that he did not. There
was nothing about Appellant's circumstances that fell outside the boundaries of normal conduct
when Officer effectuated his overhead lights and seized Appellant.
Respondent also asserts that the facts presented in State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Idaho
App. 2006) provide an analogous scenario to the facts in our case. In Cutler, an ambulance
responded to a report of an incoherent man sitting in the driver's seat of a diagonally parked
vehicle in front of a closed store at 6:30 A.M. Id. at 300. After medical personnel determined
that the defendant didn't need immediate medical assistance, they informed a responding officer
that the defendant was extremely lethargic and then left the scene. Id. The responding officer
then observed that a handgun was located inside the vehicle on a ledge, next to the driver's seat.

Id. The officer then removed the gun, frisked the defendant for weapons, and after finding two
pocket knives and a loaded magazine for the gun, he seized the defendant. Id. The Court
concluded the officer's actions were justified by pointing to the facts the officer was aware of
when he made the seizure: the defendant's extreme lethargy, the manner his vehicle was parked,
and the presence of a handgun. Id. at 303. The Court also pointed out that the intrusion into the
defendant's privacy was only minimally exceeded by the officer's decision to remain at the scene
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since his privacy interest had already been compromised by the emergency medical personnel's
intrusion. Id.
The factual scenario in our case is far different from that presented in Cutler. Once
again, Officer Wade did not observe Appellant to be incoherent or to appear in any sort of danger
when he arrived on scene. Medical personnel were never called to assist Appellant, nor was he
in front of a closed store at odd hours. In Cutler, the officer had direct contact with medical
personnel who told him of defendant's condition, where in our case Officer Wade only had a
report of an elderly man who "seemed confused." Officer Wade did not witness anything that
would substantiate the report himself before he made the seizure of Appellant. Also, there was
no report or sign of any weapons in Appellant's vehicle.

In Cutler, the intrusion into the

defendant's privacy interest was relatively minor because of the presence of the medical
personnel.

Here, Appellant was abiding by all traffic laws with no outward appearance of

distress and had previously denied the need for further assistance. The seizure was a major
intrusion that cannot be justified by all surrounding circumstances.

CONCLUSION
Appellant entered into a written Rule l l(a)(2) plea agreement with the prosecuting
attorney that reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Further, as
provided in the arguments provided above, the Magistrates Order denying the motion to suppress
should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceeding.
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DATED this 9h day of October, 2012.

LOVAN ROKER & ROUNDS, P.C.

r:i~4
£
~----=--=

MATTHEW J. R O ~
Attorney for Appellant
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JAMES A. SCHILLER
MAGISTRATE COURT JUDGE
CANYON COUNTY COURTHOUSE
1115 Albany Street
CALDWELL, ID 83605

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATEHOUSE, ROOM 210
PO BOX 83720
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CALDWELL CITY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
110 South 5th Avenue
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